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Abstract
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the Japanese government tried
to democratize energy policy-making by introducing public participation.
Over the course of its implementation, however, public participation came
to be subordinated to expert committees as the primary mechanism of
policy rationalization. The expert committees not only neutralized the
results of public participation but also discounted the necessity of public
participation itself. This trajectory of public participation, from its historic
introduction to eventual collapse, can be fully explained only in reference to
complex interactions between the macroinstitutions and microsituations of
Japanese policy-making at the time of the nuclear disaster: the macro-
institutional reassembling of the developmental state to reallocate more
power from the bureaucracy to the cabinet office and the civil society vis-a`-
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vis the microsituational, shifting power dynamics involving political parties,
citizens and NGOs, businesses and labor unions, and other relevant actors.
This case study thus helps advance the growing science and technology
studies research on how the macro and microparameters of policy-making,
ranging from the durable institutions of nation-states to situationally specific
political struggles, combine to shape the designs, implementations, and
policy influences of public participation at particular places and times as well
as in particular policy domains.
Keywords
democracy, epistemic authority, expertise, nuclear energy, political
economy
While the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was still unfolding in March
2011, the Japanese government and citizens began to rethink their country’s
energy policy. They debated whether or not nuclear energy should be phased
out, how renewable energy shouldbepromoted, and how the electricitymarket
should be liberalized, among many other substantive issues (Samuels 2013).
More important, they debated the procedure of energy policy-making itself—
how it should become more democratic, moving away from the hitherto top-
down approach centered on the government. Against the backdrop of this
nationwide debate, the government introduced deliberative polling and other
forms of public participation in summer 2012, opening up energy policy-
making to citizens on an unprecedented scale (Mikami 2015).
Nevertheless, over the course of its implementation, public participation
came to be subordinated to expert committees as the primary mechanism of
policy rationalization. The expert committees in the government not only
neutralized the results of public participation favoring the nuclear phaseout
but also discounted the necessity of public participation itself. In fact, the
government even redeployed pronuclear experts to rationalize the continuing
promotion of nuclear energy (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
2014). This trajectory of public participation in post–Fukushima Japan, from
its historic introduction to eventual collapse, can be fully explained only in
reference to complex interactions between the macroinstitutions and micro-
situations of Japanese policy-making at the time of the nuclear disaster.
Specifically, the nuclear disaster coincided, on the one hand, with the
reassembling of the developmental state that had begun in the 1990s to
reallocate more power from the bureaucracy to the cabinet office and the
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civil society and, on the other hand, with the temporary rule of the Dem-
ocratic Party of Japan (DPJ) more open to public participation than its
predecessor the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This critical juncture
created an initial, significant opening for DPJ members and citizens who
wished to democratize energy policy-making in pursuit of the nuclear pha-
seout. Nevertheless, the opening was subsequently closed by the pronuclear
wing of the developmental state that reclaimed its epistemic authority with
the help of the LDP, pronuclear businesses and labor unions, and the US
government. Thus, illustrating the trajectory of public participation in post–
Fukushima Japan, this case study contributes to the understanding of how
the designs, implementations, and policy influences of public participation
are mediated by both macro and microparameters of policy-making unique
to a given nation-state.
The Macro and Microparameters of Public
Participation
Policy deliberation on highly technical issues has been largely dictated by
experts who are defined as the bearers of relevant technical knowledge and
hence authorized to make decisions on behalf of citizens. Although expert
advice is useful in highly technical policy issues, it also introduces a sig-
nificant power asymmetry between experts and citizens, constraining the
process of democratic decision-making (Brown 2009; Fischer 2009; Turner
2003). To address and counter such epistemic inequality as a threat to
democracy, however, various forms of public participation have been
invented in recent decades and circulated around the world (Lengwiler
2008; Vob and Amelung 2016). Witnessing this worldwide trend, science
and technology studies (STS) researchers have also made a “public turn” to
document these new “technologies” of public participation and examine
their implications for science and technology policy-making, especially
how public participation can help make “delegative democracy” more
“dialogic” (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2009) by promoting “more
meaningful interaction among policy-makers, scientific experts, corporate
producers, and the public” (Jasanoff 2003, 238).
Initially, the STS research on public participation was driven by norma-
tive concerns—how to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various
forms of public participation, such as public hearings, public opinion sur-
veys, negotiated rule making, citizens’ panels, and consensus conferences,
in terms of their contributions to the democratization of science and tech-
nology policy-making (Fiorino 1990; Laird 1993; Rowe and Frewer 2000).
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Accordingly, this initial research tended to focus on the processes and out-
comes internal to different forms of public participation, bracketing history,
culture, politics, the economy, and other parameters of a given polity
“shaping scientific understandings and normative representational perfor-
mances of its ‘democratic’ publics” (Wynne 2007, 99).
The latest wave of STS research, however, has begun to examine how
the macroinstitutions and microsituations of policy-making mediate the
designs, implementations, and policy influences of public participation at
particular places and times. One strand of this latest wave emphasizes how
the macroinstitutions of nation-states, such as “technopolitical cultures”
(Felt and Fochler 2010) and “civic epistemologies” (Jasanoff 2005), struc-
ture the situated practices of public participation on the constitutional
dimension of meaning-making. As Chilvers and Kearnes (2015, 53) sug-
gested, these macroinstitutions, “which are grounded in public life and
discourse, can help to explain how some collective participatory practices
become established and others struggle to achieve relevance or become
endangered in particular settings.” In other words, public participation, no
matter how formalized, always happens within the larger environment of
science and technology policy-making unique to a given nation-state.
Another strand of the latest wave, cross-fertilizing STS with social
movement studies (Frickel et al. 2010; Hess 2015), emphasizes the rele-
vance of micro, shifting situations of policy-making, such as mobilizing
structures, political opportunities, and framing processes: which design of
public participation is adopted, how it is implemented, and how its outcome
influences the government’s policy depends on how much competing net-
works of stakeholders can mobilize expertise, money, and other resources
for their goals, how open the political system is toward public participation,
and how effectively the legitimacy of public participation is discursively
framed. This strand complements the other one by foregrounding the fact
that the processes and outcomes of public participation are not monocau-
sally determined by macroinstitutions but instead contingent on their com-
plex interactions with more micro, situationally specific dynamics of
policy-making.
Specifically, these two strands together point to the existence of a feed-
back loop between macro and microparameters of policy-making, for
macroinstitutions like nation-states are composed of microsituations, that
is, interactions between humans, enabled by facilities, technologies, and
other nonhumans (Callon and Latour 1981). While institutions acquire
“macro-ness” through laws, facilities, and other mechanisms of power that
pattern a wide range of interactions across time and space (Latour 2005), the
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reproduction of macroinstitutions is in turn contingent on repeated enact-
ment of scripted interactions and subject to contestations at the micro level
(Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). Generally, macroinstitutions become
“locked in” and reproduce their overall trajectories through “path
dependence” (Pierson 2004), but microsituations also continuously and
incrementally modify macroinstitutions through the “layering” or
“grafting” of new institutional elements (Thelen 2004). In fact, “eventful”
microsituations or “initially localized ruptures” can trigger drastic macro-
institutional transformations like revolutions “when a sequence of interre-
lated ruptures disarticulates the previous structural network” (Sewell 2005,
228).
In this sense, the design, implementation, and policy influence of public
participation are caught and shaped within such a feedback loop between
the macroinstitutions and microsituations of policy-making in a given
nation-state. This is why the aforesaid two strands can jointly expand the
STS research on public participation by taking into account both macro and
microparameters of policy-making as well as their interactions.
The Institutions and Situations of Japanese
policy-making
Here, I suggest that energy policy-making in post–Fukushima Japan can
usefully serve as a case to illuminate how the macroinstitutions and micro-
situations of policy-making in a particular nation-state mediate the design,
implementation, and policy influence of public participation. To begin with,
the macroinstitutions of policy-making in Japan have been centered on the
“developmental state.” As Johnson (1999, 38) observed, the developmental
state is organized around “elite state bureaucracy staffed by the best man-
agerial talent available in the system,” which deploys market-conforming
interventions to develop chosen industries to become internationally com-
petitive while transforming the structures of the national economy. This
developmental state differs from its more “regulatory” counterpart often
found in North America andWestern Europe—the regulatory state plays the
role of “umpire,” setting the rules of competition in the market rather than
actively intervening it with industrial policy (Woo-Cumings 1999).
Importantly, because the developmental-state bureaucracy is “composed
of the nation’s best and brightest, as identified by their performance in the
nation’s elite universities” (Loriaux 1999, 235), its orientations are predo-
minantly technocratic and, in fact, “more technocratic than bureaucratic”
with its self-assigned mission to accomplish “a fundamental transformation
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of the economic order (regardless of the interests or desires of the civil
society)” (Castells 1992, 57, 64). To be sure, all modern states assert their
epistemic authority because the knowledge-making is integral to the state-
making—knowledge of the population, the economy, and scientific and
technological developments, among other things—and allows state bureau-
cracies to effectively formulate and implement policies (Jasanoff 2004;
Mitchell 1988). However, the degree to which the developmental state
claims epistemic authority is significantly higher than other types of states
because of its historically distinct mission of late industrialization, wherein
“the state [came] first, followed by conscious or unconscious attempts to
create industry, big business . . . and then and only then ‘society’” (Cumings
1999, 89).1
Accordingly, the modus operandi of the developmental state is the exten-
sive use of expert committees across government ministries and agencies,
whereby bureaucrats mostly bypass democratic deliberation by mobilizing
experts who offer their recommendations as the rational basis of the gov-
ernment’s policies (Iio 2007; Morita 2006; Shindo 2012). Put the other way
around, the developmental state has assumed the “deficit” of relevant exper-
tise on the part of the civil society (cf. Wynne 2007) and long excluded
citizens from policy-making. As a result, most nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) in Japan have not engaged in policy advocacy but only helped
the government implement its policies by mobilizing local populations
(Ogawa 2009), while a small number of advocacy NGOs have been chroni-
cally short on professional staff with relevant expertise capable of challen-
ging the government’s policies (Pekkanen 2004).
The developmental state, however, is neither monolithic nor constant.
Because any state is essentially composed of heterogeneous and shifting
networks of actors from various domains of society, the developmental
“stateness” has varied across different industries and time periods (Carroll
and Jarvis 2017). Especially since neoliberalism emerged as a global idea-
tional force of policy-making in the 1990s, the developmental state has been
reshaped by the evolving competition between networks of policymakers
aligned differently with neoliberalism and developmentalism (Haggard
2018); for example, agricultural, financial, postal, and other industries in
Japan were deregulated during the last three decades, albeit to different
degrees. Equally important, a series of political reforms have been imple-
mented since the 1990s to consolidate ministries and agencies while
reallocating more power from the bureaucracy to the cabinet office to
enable more coordinated, efficient, and responsive policy-making
(PrimeMinister’s Office 1998). The passage of the Non-Profit Organization
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(NPO) Law in 1998 also significantly increased the number of NGOs that
“specifically prize their independence from the bureaucracy” (Pekkanen
2004, 373).
Nevertheless, the developmental state has been particularly resilient in
the domain of energy policy. Ever since the Meiji period, energy sources
have been regarded as indispensable for developing Japan’s industrial
capacity as a means to improve the country’s security and status in inter-
national society (Samuels 1994); for example, one of the main reasons
Japan waged the Asia-Pacific War (1937–1945) was to secure energy
sources to strengthen the industrial and military power of its empire, and
the wartime government also nationalized electric power companies
because energy supply became an urgent policy issue (Kikkawa 2004, chap.
4). Given this historical trajectory, even though the postwar government
ceased to control the electric power industry, it continued to closely colla-
borate with electric power companies in energy policy-making, especially
with regard to the promotion of nuclear energy (Yoshioka 2011). Indeed,
the postwar developmental state was historically coterminous with “an
economy mobilized for war but never demobilized during peacetime”
(Johnson 1999, 41).
To be sure, bureaucrats and politicians aligned with neoliberalism tried
to reform Japan’s energy policy between 1994 and 2002 by liberalizing the
electricity market; however, their attempt did not result in any significant
reform, for the ten electric power companies wanted to maintain full-cost
pricing and regional monopoly—the mechanisms that the developmental
state had institutionalized in its heyday to promote nuclear energy (Kami-
kawa 2018, 133-37). As a result, even when the DPJ came to power in
August 2009, ending the LDP’s long dominance, it also supported the
quintessentially developmental-statist energy policy. Specifically, the DPJ
government proposed to construct fourteen new nuclear reactors in addition
to the existing fifty-four to “guarantee [Japan’s] energy security” and pro-
mote “all-Japan, the government-industry joint effort” for exporting nuclear
and other energy technologies to developing countries (Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy 2010).
At the same time, however, the DPJ adopted the “anti-bureaucracy”
platform, riding on the political reforms since the 1990s, to “replace the
bureaucracy-dominated politics with the politician-led politics” and “think
about policy issues from the citizen’s perspective” (DPJ 2009). To this end,
DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio established the expert committee on
“New Public Commons” in October 2010 to explore how to promote citi-
zens and NGOs as new actors in public management, while his government
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began to deliberate on a reform of the 1999 NPO Law to expediate the
certification process, expand the eligibility criteria, and increase tax bene-
fits—namely, to provide more support for NGOs (Cabinet Office 2010,
2011). Consistent with its anti-bureaucracy and pro-civil-society orienta-
tion, the DPJ government also introduced for the first time a public hearing
on the Basic Energy Plan, the most important policy document for Japan’s
mid-term and long-term energy policy (Institute for Sustainable Energy
Policies 2014).
In short, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster happened when the reas-
sembling of the developmental state at the macro level coincided with the
DPJ’s temporary control of the government at the micro level. On the one
hand, the DPJ government intended to maintain pronuclear energy policy
within the purview of the developmental state, despite the increasing force
of neoliberalism in policy-making. On the other hand, the DPJ government
was critical of the long-standing dominance of the state bureaucracy as a
sine qua non of the developmental state, seeking to empower politicians and
citizens. Against the background of this complex and even contradictory
landscape of Japanese policy-making, the nuclear disaster galvanized citi-
zens and NGOs across Japan to join forces to demand the government
should phase out nuclear energy and, more importantly, allow citizens to
participate in energy policy-making; for the many citizens and NGOs felt
that the disaster was ultimately caused by the government’s pronuclear
policy that had constantly disregarded their safety concerns (e-shift 2011;
Oguma 2013). Thus, the nuclear disaster precipitated a potentially
“constitutional moment” (Jasanoff 2011, 623) for public participation in
energy policy-making.
Introducing Public Participation
In early April 2011, while working with Tokyo Electric Power Company
(TEPCO) to contain the nuclear disaster, the DPJ government began to
discuss how to reform Japan’s energy policy (Asahi shinbun 2011a). In
June, DPJ Prime Minister Kan Naoto, who became increasingly opposed
to nuclear energy, proceeded to create the Energy and Environmental Coun-
cil (EEC) to “fundamentally rethink Japan’s energy policy that depended on
nuclear energy for more than a half of total electricity supply” and
“formulate energy and environmental strategies based on energy efficiency
and renewable energy” (EEC 2011a). The creation of EEC within the cab-
inet office was a significant challenge to the extant procedure of energy
policy-making dominated by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
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(METI), especially its subsidiary Agency for Natural Resources and
Energy, that had promoted nuclear energy since the mid-1950s. Such a
procedural change happened primarily because Kan used various microsi-
tuational tactics to take advantage of the cabinet office’s authority over the
state bureaucracy at the macroinstitutional level, hoping to make best of the
nuclear disaster to restore the DPJ’s declining popularity and prolong his
administration (Kamikawa 2018, chap. 6).
Then, in late July, EEC came up with three basic principles for subse-
quent policy deliberation: to find the “new best mix” of available energy
sources by reducing Japan’s dependency on nuclear energy, to create a
“new energy system” by decentralizing electricity generation, and to pro-
mote “nationwide discussion” on Japan’s energy policy, involving diverse
groups of citizens and other stakeholders (EEC 2011b). The third principle
was unprecedented for energy policy-making in Japan, signaling the gov-
ernment’s intention to take seriously the demand from citizens and NGOs.
Although Kan was replaced by his less antinuclear successor Noda Yoshi-
hiko in early September 2011, the DPJ government proceeded to deliberate
on Japan’s energy policy according to EEC’s three basic principles.
In the meantime, METI commissioned the Advisory Committee for Nat-
ural Resources and Energy (ACNRE) to revise the existing Basic Energy
Plan, which had proposed to expand nuclear energy to make up 53 percent of
Japan’s total electricity generation by 2030, while celebrating the worldwide
“nuclear renaissance” as a solution for reducing carbon dioxide emissions
(Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2010): revision of such a heavily
pronuclear plan became politically necessary, as most citizens began to sup-
port the nuclear phaseout (Asahi shinbun 2011b). Since ACNRE had previ-
ously consisted of almost all pronuclear experts, handpicked by METI, to
ritually rationalize the government’s policy to promote nuclear energy, Kan
and other DPJ Diet members sought to appoint the equal numbers of pro-
nuclear and antinuclear experts to change the dynamics of energy policy-
making (Oshika 2013, chap. 14). Although their effort was countered by
pronuclear METI bureaucrats, the DPJ government nonetheless managed
to increase the number of antinuclear experts to comprise one third of the
committee (ACNRE Subcommittee on Basic Policy 2011a). Most notably,
the committee now included two of the most prominent antinuclear experts in
Japan: Ban Hideyuki, codirector of Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center,
and Iida Tetsunari, director of Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies.
By newly appointing these counter-experts, the DPJ government rede-
fined the task of ACNRE: instead of rationalizing the single best mix of
energy sources, ACNRE was now asked to suggest several energy mixes in
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light of diverse opinions of its members. Such diversification of possible
energy mixes was a prerequisite for EEC’s third basic principle for reform-
ing Japan’s energy policy—the introduction of “nationwide discussion,”
wherein citizens would debate which best mix they preferred most. In fact,
ACNRE began to deliberate on how to design nationwide discussion at its
first meeting in early October 2011, when Edahiro Junko, then director of
the Institute for Studies in Happiness, Economy and Society, took the lead
by suggesting the possibility of “organizing discussion among younger
generations and taking their voices as feedback” (ACNRE Subcommittee
on Basic Policy 2011b). Edahiro’s suggestion was subsequently reinforced
by Ban and Iida who argued that simply soliciting opinions from citizens in
the form of “public comments” would be inadequate; instead, “public
debates across Japan” and “a wide variety of public discussions in the spirit
of deliberative democracy” would be crucial if energy policy-making were
to be meaningfully opened up to citizens (ACNRE Subcommittee on Basic
Policy 2011c, 2011d).
In early 2012, ACNRE accelerated its deliberation on the form of public
participation to meet the timetable set by EEC. To assist ACNRE’s delib-
eration, Edahiro submitted a memo listing various forms of public partic-
ipation that Japan could borrow from other countries, such as deliberative
polling and consensus conference (ACNRE Subcommittee on Basic Policy
2012a) and, at subsequent committee meetings, deliberative polling
emerged as the most promising form of public participation. This was
because committee members agreed with available academic research
showing that deliberative polling would reflect public opinions more accu-
rately than traditional polling and town-hall meetings, on the one hand, and
would allow more active participation from citizens than public comments,
on the other hand (ACNRE Subcommittee on Basic Policy 2012b, 2012c).
Concurrently, to provide a focal point for nationwide discussion, ACNRE
narrowed down possible scenarios for Japan’s energy mixes in 2030 as
follows: (1) nuclear-free, (2) 15 percent nuclear, (3) 20-25 percent nuclear,
and (4) the energy mix should be determined by the market.
In light of ACNRE’s recommendation, in late June 2012, the DPJ gov-
ernment decided to use deliberative polling, as well as public comments and
public hearings, as the forms of public participation in nationwide discus-
sion on energy policy. The government also decided to organize nationwide
discussion around three energy-mix scenarios for 2030: nuclear-free, 15
percent nuclear, and 20-25 percent nuclear (EEC 2012a). Thus, in the
aftermath of the nuclear disaster, the DPJ government reformed the proce-
dure of energy policy-making—hitherto dominated by the developmental
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state and its pronuclear experts—by introducing public participation
to enable citizens to deliberate on multiple scenarios of Japan’s future
energy mix.
At first glance, the DPJ government’s decision to introduce public par-
ticipation at the national level signaled a significant departure from the
modus operandi of the developmental state that had assumed an epistemic
deficit on the part of the civil society. At the same time, although the DPJ
government created the three energy-mix scenarios for 2030, the majority
of METI bureaucrats, ACNRE members, and DPJ ministers already sup-
ported the 15 percent nuclear scenario as a compromise between the two
other ones (Oshika 2013, 579-83). This is because the DPJ government
considered the nuclear-free scenario economically infeasible, given the
significant weightage of nuclear energy in the pre-Fukushima energy mix,
and the 20-25 percent nuclear scenario politically infeasible because this
would entail the construction of new nuclear reactors to replace the aging
ones. For the DPJ government, then, the 15 percent nuclear scenario was
both economically and politically the safest because it could be accom-
plished simply by phasing out the existing nuclear reactors when they
would reach the legally binding age limit. This was why Edahiro, who had
advocated public participation together with Ban and Iida, feared that the
upcoming nationwide discussion, historic as it may be, would end up being
treated as “a performance” to simply create the impression that energy
policy-making became more democratic (ACNRE Subcommittee on Basic
Policy 2012d).
Negotiating the Results of Public Participation
The three forms of public participation—public comments, public hearings,
and deliberative polling—were implemented between July and August
2012. First, 89,124 public comments were submitted between July 2 and
August 12: about 81 percent of them supported the immediate nuclear-free
scenario, and about 9 percent the gradual phaseout of nuclear energy (Asahi
shinbun 2012a). Second, the government held eleven public hearings across
Japan between July 14 and August 4. Among 1,447 people who expressed
their opinions at public hearings, 68 percent supported the immediate
nuclear-free scenario, and 11 percent supported the reduction of nuclear
energy to 15 percent by 2030 (Asahi shinbun 2012a). Third, the government
organized a two-day deliberative polling in early August. Prior to this two-
day event, the government had conducted a conventional polling with ran-
domly selected 6,849 people. Then, within this pool, 285 people
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volunteered to participate in deliberative polling (see Mikami 2015, for
detailed discussion of the procedure.) After two days of deliberation, the
percentage of those who supported multiple scenarios or none decreased
significantly. Instead, those who supported the nuclear-free scenario
increased from 32.6 to 46.7 percent, whereas those who supported the 15
and 25 percent nuclear scenarios, respectively, decreased from 18.2 to 15.4
and remained 13.0 (Cabinet Secretariat 2012a).
The results encouraged antinuclear NGOs and also prompted Ban and
Iida, together with members of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, to
launch the Nationwide Network for the Nuclear Phase-Out Law, lobbying
Diet members to legislate the national goal of phasing out nuclear energy by
2025 (Datsugenpatsuho¯ Seitei Nettowa¯ku 2012). By contrast, the results of
public participation surprised the DPJ government that had expected the
majority of participants to prefer the 15 percent nuclear scenario (Asahi
shinbun 2012b). In fact, pronuclear METI bureaucrats were critical of the
nationwide discussion, calling it “populism” inappropriate for deliberation
on “such an important policy issue” (quoted in Oshika 2013, 592). Thus, to
interpret the surprising results of public participation to its advantage, the
government hurriedly set up a new expert committee to “rationally accept
the results of nationwide discussion” by taking into account “the limitations
of the methods of public participation [i.e. public comments, public hear-
ings, and deliberative polling]” (Asahi shinbun 2012c) in addition to the
existing committee specifically tasked to evaluate deliberative polling.
To begin with, the existing committee criticized the implementation of
deliberative polling for “being too rushed” and faulted it for causing various
problems that undermined the validity of the results; the committee then
concluded that “the results of deliberative polling are only one of many
factors of policy decision . . . and the government’s final decision may well
be different from them” (Independent Investigative Committee on Delib-
erative Polling 2012). This recommendation, to decouple the results of
public participation from policy decision, was reinforced by the new expert
committee that examined the results of nationwide discussion as a whole.
Although committee members hailed the historic significance of public
participation at the national level, they also feared that citizens had not
been adequately informed of what had been at stake in Japan’s energy
policy; for example, Kobayashi Tadashi and Sato Takumi, professors at
Osaka and Kyoto Universities, respectively, differentiated “ill-informed
public sentiments” and “well-informed public opinions” and argued that
the nationwide discussion had reflected the former, rather than the latter,
due to various biases in the design and implementation of public
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participation (EEC Investigative Committee on Nationwide Discussion
2012).2 In the end, the committee concluded that, even though the majority
of citizens preferred a nuclear-free society, they had divergent opinions on
the manner and pace of nuclear phaseout (EEC 2012b).
The results of public participation were not only neutralized by the
expert committees but also strongly objected by the three largest business
interest groups—Japan Business Federation, Japan Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, and Japan Association of Corporate Executives. In their pol-
icy recommendations, the three interest groups supported 20-25 percent
nuclear as the only realistic energy-mix scenario and pressed the DPJ gov-
ernment to promote nuclear energy, emphasizing its indispensable role in
securing the “stable and economical supply of energy” for both businesses
and citizens (Japan Association of Corporate Executives 2012; Japan Busi-
ness Federation 2012a; Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2012).
Similarly, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation, one of the major DPJ
supporters, opposed the nuclear phaseout because its major constituent
organizations were pronuclear (Kamikawa 2018, 225-30). In particular, the
Federation of Electric Power Related Industry Worker’s Unions of Japan
actively lobbied DPJ Diet members to support nuclear energy, distributing a
memo explaining how the nuclear-free scenario would significantly
increase the price of electricity and threatening to withdraw its support from
them if they advocated the nuclear phaseout (Oshika 2013, 599).
Neither did the US government—Japan’s most important ally—wel-
come the nuclear phaseout, for it had concerns for the American nuclear
industry that had benefited from extensive collaborations with its Japanese
counterpart since the 1960s. General Electric and Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, for example, had helped TEPCO and Kansai Electric Power
Company build the first nuclear power plants in Japan, including the one
that caused the 2011 nuclear disaster, and continued their partnerships with
Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and other Japanese companies (Yoshioka
2011, chap. 4). Equally important, the US government was afraid that
Japan’s nuclear phaseout would cause a security problem regarding the
Non-Proliferation Treaty vis-a`-vis the US-Japan Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement. Because Japan was the only nonweapons country possessing
major fuel reprocessing facilities that could be used to develop nuclear
bombs, what Japan might do with its facilities and spent nuclear fuels, if
it phased out its civilian nuclear program, was concerning to the US gov-
ernment (Arima 2012; Ota 2015). For these economic and security reasons,
several high-ranking officials of the US government, including the
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Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, cautioned the DPJ government against the
nuclear-free scenario (Asahi shinbun 2012d; Iida 2017, 75).
Given these contradictory demands from citizens and NGOs, businesses
and labor unions, and the US government, EEC members engaged in a
heated debate. The minority of EEC members, including the chairman
Furukawa Motohisa, sought to adopt the nuclear-free scenario as the gov-
ernment’s policy, partly because they championed the nationwide discus-
sion as an exemplar of democracy and partly because they thought the
nuclear phaseout would help the DPJ win the next election; however, they
were eventually outpowered by the majority of EEC members, DPJ minis-
ters, and METI bureaucrats who advocated maintaining nuclear energy
(Oshika 2013, chap. 20). As a result, although EEC (2012c) recommended
that the government should mobilize “all available policy resources” to go
nuclear-free in the 2030s, it also recommended the promotion of nuclear
energy by maintaining the existing nuclear fuel cycle to reprocess spent
nuclear fuels and exporting Japan’s nuclear technologies to other countries.
After all, instead of officially accepting EEC’s recommendation, the DPJ
government simply issued the following short statement in September 2012
without committing Japan’s energy policy to any of the three energy-mix
scenarios that citizens had deliberated on: “To formulate new energy and
environmental policies, we will take into account EEC’s recommendation,
conduct responsible discussion with relevant municipalities and interna-
tional society, and obtain support from citizens, while maintaining flexibil-
ity and constant self-examination” (Cabinet Secretariat 2012b).
Given the DPJ government’s ambiguous policy position, ACNRE Chair-
man Mimura Akio, president of Nippon Steel Corporation, proposed to
suspend deliberation on the next Basic Energy Plan until the government
would clarify its policy position on nuclear energy (ACNRE Subcommittee
on Basic Policy 2012e). His proposal was supported by METI, the secretar-
iat of ACNRE. METI was in no hurry to reform Japan’s energy policy
because a general election was expected soon; as public support for the
DPJ government was dipping due to its unpopular decision to raise con-
sumption tax (Y. Kobayashi 2012), METI anticipated that the LDP, a polit-
ical party that had initiated and promoted Japan’s civilian nuclear program
since 1950s, would return to power and reverse the energy-policy reform
that the DPJ government had initiated (Asahi shinbun 2012e).
Thus, the policy influence of the historic public participation in summer
2012 was mixed. The pronuclear wing of the developmental state made use
of the two expert committees to neutralize the results of public participation
and decouple them from the final policy decision to be made by the
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government. The developmental state’s reassertion of its epistemic author-
ity was possible thanks to the pronuclear businesses and labor unions, as
well the US government, pressuring the DPJ government to maintain
nuclear energy. Nevertheless, the pronuclear wing could not afford to com-
pletely ignore the majority of citizens favoring the nuclear phaseout. Thus,
public participation did influence energy policy in post–Fukushima Japan,
even though its influence was significantly curtailed. The question was
whether the policy influence of public participation would persist or fade
after the upcoming general election.
Reversing Public Participation
As anticipated by METI, the LDP won the general election in December
2012. The LDP’s return to power was welcomed by electric power compa-
nies and other businesses that had been frustrated with the DPJ’s handling
of energy policy (Asahi shinbun 2012f, 2012g). Soon after the LDP formed
a coalition government with Ko¯meito¯, LDP Prime Minister Abe Shinzo¯
criticized the DPJ for having pursued the nuclear phaseout “without any
concrete basis and, as the result, caused anxiety and mistrust among host
municipalities . . . international society and the business community, and
citizens” (House of Representatives 2013). As a first step to reverse the
DPJ’s energy-policy reform, the LDP-Ko¯meito¯ government downsized
ACNRE from twenty-five members to fifteen, removed Ban, Edahiro, Iida,
and other members who had advocated public participation and appointed
thirteen pronuclear experts (ACNRE Subcommittee on Basic Policy
2013a).
Given its new member composition, ACNRE proceeded to draft a new
Basic Energy Plan by emphasizing the importance of nuclear energy. At the
committee meeting in October 2013, for example, Nishikawa Kazumi,
governor of Fukui Prefecture hosting more than a dozen of nuclear reactors,
argued that the new Basic Energy Plan should clearly maintain the existing
nuclear fuel cycle. Nishikawa’s pronuclear position was supported by
Yamana Hajimu, professor of nuclear engineering at Kyoto University, who
warned that “it is dangerous to rapidly decrease the degree of nuclear
dependency, given the amount of time and investment, as well as associated
risks, in securing alternative energy sources . . . . We should continue to
designate nuclear energy as a key energy source” (ACNRE Subcommittee
on Basic Policy 2013b). These pronuclear comments led Tatsumi Kikuko,
one of the two antinuclear committee members, to lament, “It sounds as
though there were no room for critical discussion . . . [and] last year’s
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nationwide discussion—the voice of citizens against nuclear energy—has
so far been ignored in our deliberation” (ACNRE Subcommittee on Basic
Policy 2013b).
Then, in December 2013, ACNRE produced a draft of the new Basic
Energy Plan, designating “3E þ S” (“energy security, economic efficiency,
and environment plus safety”) as the overall framework for Japan’s new
energy policy. Within this framework, nuclear energy was defined as “an
important baseload energy source that Japan will continue to take advantage
of” because it was “stable and cheap as well as helpful in reducing carbon
dioxide emissions,” while renewable energy was regarded as promising but
“faced with various challenges in terms of stability and costs” (ACNRE
Subcommittee on Basic Policy 2013c). Thus, under the LDP-Ko¯meito¯ gov-
ernment, ANCRE re-legitimated nuclear energy by disregarding the 2012
nationwide discussion.
In response, Citizens’ Committee on Nuclear Energy (2013), a new
umbrella organization for antinuclear and environmental NGOs, criticized
ACNRE’s draft Basic Energy Plan for ignoring the results of public partic-
ipation and downplaying various disadvantages of nuclear energy. The
nonpartisan Nuclear-Free Association, consisting of sixty-four National
Diet members, also issued a statement demanding that the new Basic
Energy Plan should adopt the nuclear phaseout as Japan’s official policy.
Specifically, the association emphasized that “since citizens are the sover-
eign in energy policy-making, their expressed wish for a nuclear-free soci-
ety should be respected” (Nuclear-Free Association 2014). In addition,
Friends of the Earth Japan and its allies (2014) questioned why the LDP-
Ko¯meito¯ government planned only one round of public comments on the
draft energy plan this time, arguing that such a superficial form of public
participation would regress greatly from the 2012 nationwide discussion
and that more meaningful forms of public participation should be reinstated.
Nevertheless, the LDP-Ko¯meito¯ government organized only one round
of public comments between December 2013 and January 2014, as origi-
nally planned, by stating that “no law requires the government to consult
with citizens on the Basic Energy Plan”—hence even one round of public
comments should be more than enough in light of the legal requirements
(METI 2014). Moreover, in response to 18,711 public comments submitted
on a draft of the New Basic Energy Plan, about 94 percent of which opposed
nuclear energy (Komori 2016, 82-89), the government made mostly stylis-
tic changes and proceeded to finalize the draft in April 2014. The new Basic
Energy Plan thus emphasized the increasing vulnerability of Japan’s energy
security “in the midst of ongoing large-scale geopolitical changes” and
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warranted the promotion of nuclear energy as a “stable and cheap supply of
energy” for sustaining Japan’s economic recovery (Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy 2014). Equally important, the new Basic Energy
Plan discounted the necessity of public participation in energy policy-mak-
ing by describing citizens as passive audiences who needed to “deepen their
understanding of the real situations concerning energy,” on the one hand,
and encouraging the government to use more effective “public relations”
and “education” to help citizens “increase their trust in energy policy,” on
the other hand (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2014). As Suzuki
(2017, 89), a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, later observed,
the LDP-Ko¯meito¯ government “aborted . . . and even reversed the reform of
energy policy-making.”
Such a dramatic reversal in the trajectory of public participation under the
LDP-Ko¯meito¯ government was possible because the LDP had been a key
member of the “nuclear energy village” (Funabashi 2012), a network of actors
in national and municipal governments, nuclear-related industries, and other
sectors of society; for example, from the mid-1950s onward, the LDP govern-
ment had created laws and policies, such as full-cost pricing and regional
monopoly in electricity generation and transmission, to ensure the profitability
of nuclear energy, while electric power companies in turn used their profits to
make huge monetary contributions to LDP politicians and create lucrative
advisory positions for retired bureaucrats from energy-related ministries and
agencies (Komatsu 2012). In fact, after the LDP ousted the DPJ, the LDP-
Ko¯meito¯ government facilitated the restart of Units 1 and 2 at Sendai Nuclear
Power Plant, the first nuclear reactors to be restarted under the new regulatory
framework, while accelerating the negotiations of nuclear energy cooperation
agreementswithUnitedArabEmirates, Turkey, India, andother countries—as
part and parcel of Japan’s “economic growth strategy” (Watanabe et al. 2014).
In short, the developmental state’s reassertion of its epistemic authority in
energy policy-making was reinforced by the LDP’s enduring support for the
political economy of nuclear energy.3
Conclusion and Implications
The foregoing analysis has shown that public participation in energy policy-
making in post–Fukushima Japan went through three stages—introduction,
negotiation, and reversal. First, in response to the growing nationwide anti-
nuclear movement, the DPJ government introduced public participation on
an unprecedented scale in the forms of public comments, public hearings,
and deliberative polling. Such introduction was possible because the
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institutionally increased power of the cabinet office combined with the
DPJ’s anti-bureaucracy and pro-civil-society orientation. Second, although
these forms of public participation were implemented as part of the nation-
wide discussion in summer 2012, their results, favoring the nuclear phase-
out, had only limited influence on the DPJ government’s energy policy
because of the resistance by the pronuclear wing of the developmental state
aligned with the pronuclear businesses and labor unions as well as the US
government. Finally, after the LDP ousted the DPJ in December 2012, the
developmental state redeployed pronuclear experts to draft the new Basic
Energy Plan, not only disregarding the results of public participation but
also discounting the necessity of public participation. Thus, Japan’s historic
experiment with public participation not only failed to produce any lasting
policy influence but also triggered the counterattack from the developmen-
tal state.
This trajectory of public participation in post–Fukushima Japan was not
a foregone conclusion but a contingent outcome of complex interactions
between the macroinstitutions and microsituations of policy-making spe-
cific to contemporary Japan, that is, the macroinstitutional reassembling of
the developmental state since the 1990s vis-a`-vis the microsituational
power dynamics between the pronuclear and antinuclear members of the
DPJ and the LDP aligned differently with citizens and NGOs, businesses
and labor unions, and other relevant actors. Thus, this case study helps
advance the growing STS research on how the macro and microparameters
of policy-making, ranging from the durable institutions of nation-states to
situationally specific political struggles, together mediate the designs,
implementations, and policy influences of public participation at particular
places and times as well as in particular policy domains.
Equally important, this case study helps reframe the initial normative
concerns of the public turn, suggesting how and why the possible, desirable,
and efficacious forms of public participation might differ among nation-
states. In a way, the trajectory of public participation in post–Fukushima
Japan demonstrated that “the formal mechanisms [of public participation]
adopted by national governments are not enough . . . . What has to change
is . . . the substance of participatory politics” within an entire polity (Jasan-
off 2003, 238). Since public participation is always articulated with the
existing institutions and situations of policy-making, an answer for the
normative question “Which form of public participation should be adopted,
and how?” is bound to vary across nation-states.
This contextual thinking also complicates the task of normatively driven
evaluation of “success” or “failure” of public participation, helping the STS
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research on public participation become more aware of the heterogeneous
institutions and situations of policy-making in different nation-states rather
than imposing “best practices,” often conceived in North America and
Western Europe, on the rest of the world (Anderson 2017; Wynne 2007).
When the Japanese context is taken into account, the introduction of public
participation, especially deliberative polling, by itself can be seen as already
a “successful” precedent in the democratization of science and technology
policy-making (T. Kobayashi, Yagi, and Yamauchi 2014), quite apart from
the evaluative criteria borrowed from North America and Western Europe.
Indeed, such contextual thinking ultimately foregrounds the performative
role of STS researchers (Felt 2003) in the making of “successful” and
“failed” cases of public participation. For example, if “success” is defined
in terms of “upstream engagement” or “the macro-political uptake of mini-
publics” (Goodin and Dryzek 2006), public participation in post–Fukush-
ima Japan will be viewed as a “failure” because it was designed top-down
and had little policy influence. By contrast, if “success” involves a “good
experiment . . .where surprise occurs” (Gomart and Hajer 2003, 40), the
same event can be seen as a “success” because its implementation produced
the surprising results for the status quo.
In this regard, STS researchers can never remain neutral observers
because, intentionally or not, their analyses provide policymakers and cit-
izens with rationales for justifying their positions on public participation—
and this realization demands greater reflexivity on the part of STS research-
ers to be more sensitive to different histories, cultures, and political econo-
mies of policy-making around the world.
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Notes
1. This history of modern Japan suggests an important role of the education system
in establishing the developmental state’s epistemic authority in policy-making.
For example, the Meiji government conceived of the university as the provider of
technically competent bureaucrats, mainly in the area of engineering and law,
who could build both hard and soft infrastructures of the modern state
(Nakayama 1978). Since then, Japan’s state bureaucracy has been consistently
dominated by graduates of prestigious universities who assume their epistemic
authority to make policy decisions on behalf of citizens. This line of inquiry,
probing the intersection of science and technology studies (STS) and educational
research, seems promising, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
2. To date, STS researchers at Osaka University (T. Kobayashi, Yagi, and Yamau-
chi 2014) have produced the most comprehensive review of the 2012 nationwide
discussion. Their review shows that the expert committees were genuinely con-
cerned that public participation had been hastily designed and implemented, and
that its results were too complex to permit clear-cut conclusions, apart from the
intention of pronuclear Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry bureaucrats to
oppose the nuclear-free scenario.
3. At the same time, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has a complex and evol-
ving relationship with the developmental state; for example, after ousting the
Democratic Party of Japan, the LDP-Ko¯meito¯ government both promoted
nuclear energy (developmentalism) and liberalized the electricity market (neo-
liberalism), all the while relying heavily on expert committees in policy ratio-
nalization (Watanabe et al. 2014).
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